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Abstract In historical claims for nativism, mathematics is
a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge. Claims by
contemporary developmental psychologists of elementary
mathematical skills in human infants are a legacy of this.
However, the connection between these skills and more
formal mathematical concepts and methods remains unclear.
This paper assesses the current debates surrounding nativism
and mathematical knowledge by teasing them apart into two
distinct claims. First, in what way does the experimental
evidence from infants, nonhuman animals and neuropsy-
chology support the nativist hypothesis? Second, granting
that infants have some elementary mathematical skills, does
this mean that such skills play an important role in the
development of mathematical knowledge?
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1 Nativism and Mathematical Knowledge
Until the late eighteenth century, mathematical knowledge
was a paradigmatic example of innate knowledge. It often
served a dual purpose, providing both a persuasive reason
why innate knowledge exists, and furnishing us with an
explanation of how humans can have knowledge of
mathematical objects. Due to the increasing importance of
foundational issues and the explicit rejection of psycholo-
gism (i.e., the view that mathematics lies within the pur-
view of psychology) by Frege and others, nativism has lost
its importance in recent philosophy of mathematics. By
contrast, contemporary developmental psychologists (e.g.,
Spelke and Kinzler 2007; Carey 2004; Feigenson et al.
2004) propose that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of
mathematical knowledge. They have uncovered evidence
for early-developed mathematical skills in infants and
young children, such as the ability to estimate and dis-
criminate numerosities (Jordan and Brannon 2006), the
capacity to detect ordinal relationships between numeros-
ities (Brannon 2002), and the ability to reason about spatial
relationships in a Euclidean framework (see De Cruz 2009,
for a review).
This article examines the relevance of nativism for the
philosophy of mathematics. After providing a brief over-
view of historical claims for innate mathematical knowl-
edge, we focus on arithmetic as an example of innate
mathematical knowledge in current developmental psy-
chology. We examine in detail the claim that infants are
capable of predicting the outcomes of simple addition and
subtraction events, and look at recent objections to it. Then,
we examine to what extent this innate knowledge is
important for mathematical practice. Focusing on number
theory and arithmetic, we find that there are three possible
ways to explore the relationship between innate ideas and
mathematical practice.
1.1 Historical Claims
Plato’s Meno (ca. 380 BC [2000]) constitutes one of the
earliest direct treatments of the innateness hypothesis, and
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interestingly, it draws extensively on a mathematical
example. In this dialogue, Socrates probes the geometric
intuitions of an uneducated slave boy, leading him through
a series of questions to discover relationships between the
areas of squares drawn in the sand, including a reiteration
of the Pythagorean theorem. Given that the boy did not
learn geometry during his lifetime, Plato concluded that the
slave must have always possessed this knowledge, and that
our learning of geometric concepts is actually recollecting
(anamnesis) of what we have always known as immortal
souls. Descartes (1637 [1988], AT VI 135–137) proposed
that our experience is too limited to generate mathematical
concepts such as TRIANGLE, as we are always confronted
with imperfect examples. He also believed mathematical
intuitions to underlie more mundane forms of reasoning,
for example, that stereoscopic vision is possible through
une ge´ometrie naturelle, an innate geometry that allows us
to combine the two-dimensional images from our eyes into
a three-dimensional representation of space. Leibniz (1765
[2001]) argued that our experience of the world is always
of contingent particulars, but that our knowledge can be
general, and sometimes necessary—this is especially the
case for mathematics. He recognized that, while our
knowledge of numbers is learned, the cognitive capacity
that enables us to learn them is innate: ‘‘And I cannot
accept the proposition that whatever is learned is not
innate. The truths about numbers are in us; but still we
learn them’’ (Leibniz 1765 [2001], 85). The potential
knowledge of necessary mathematical truths is thus innate,
comparable to the veins of a marble that outline a shape
within it before being uncovered by a sculptor, just like
learning can uncover our innate knowledge (Leibniz 1765
[2001], 52). Kant’s argument from geometry presents
perhaps the most intricate classical philosophical claim for
the innateness of mathematical intuition. Kant (1781
[2005], A25/B40) specifies that our intuition of space does
not and cannot be derived from outward experience, since
the sensation of experiences outside of the self already
requires that one possesses the concept SPACE. Then, he
goes on to argue that it is precisely this intuition of space
that enables us to develop geometry as a scientific disci-
pline. Since Euclidean geometry requires us to determine
properties of space synthetically and a priori, the intuition
of Euclidean principles must already exist within the sub-
jects who learn this discipline (Kant 1781 [2005], B41).
The argumentative structure of historical accounts of
innate knowledge is very similar to that of scientists
working within nativist research programs today. Like
historical nativists, modern cognitive scientists invoke
poverty of the stimulus arguments: given that our experi-
ence is too limited to generate mathematical truths, our
knowledge of those truths must already be contained within
us. Ever since Chomsky’s seminal work on language
development in children, innateness is a central concept in
cognitive science. Yet the notion of ‘innate’ remains ill
defined, such that some philosophers of science (e.g.,
Mameli and Bateson 2006) have argued that the innate/
acquired distinction is incoherent and should be abandoned
altogether (for one thing, all traits are acquired at some
point during the development of an organism from fertil-
ized egg cell to mature individual). By contrast, others
(e.g., Samuels 2004) are not concerned with defining the
meaning of the term ‘innate’, but attempt to explain its role
and significance within scientific practice. Despite its lack
of an unambiguous definition, cognitive scientists continue
to use the concept of innateness in their explanatory
frameworks, and, as we shall see, the case of mathematics
continues to play a role in current investigations of innate
knowledge.
1.2 Current Positions in Philosophy of Mathematics
The question of how humans are able to get epistemic
access to mathematical objects is still relevant today.
Benacerraf (1973) famously argued that causal epistemic
accounts of mathematical knowledge are problematic,
because mathematical objects are often characterized as
abstract entities, which reside outside of space-time, mak-
ing it difficult for mathematicians to acquire knowledge
about them. Few contemporary philosophers of mathe-
matics are attracted to innateness as a possible solution to
this problem. To take but one example of a recent response
to Benacerraf, according to Shapiro’s (1997) ante rem
structuralism, non-applied mathematics is concerned with
structures that are conceived of as abstract entities. The
precise nature of these abstract entities is left unspecified,
as it is not essential to mathematical practice. Just as one
can talk about a goal keeper’s function in soccer (i.e.,
keeping the ball out of the goal) without going into detail
about the precise properties of the person in this position
(e.g., hair color), a mathematician can talk about the nat-
ural number 2 as a position within the structure of arith-
metic without having to worry about which set-theoretical
conceptualization captures 2 best, such as {[, {[}} or
{{[}}. If mathematical knowledge can indeed be derived
from structural properties, there is no need to look for an
experiential basis of mathematical knowledge. However,
Shapiro still needs to explain how we can conceive of
structures in the first place, and how we can grasp what is
true about them. In response to this, Shapiro (1997, 115)
invokes our ability to recognize patterns and to abstract
from particulars, leading us to recognize, for example that
‘‘the four pattern is the structure common to all collections
of four objects.’’ A similar account is Resnik’s (1982)
‘experiencing something as patterned’, where mathematics
is conceived of as the study of patterns. However, this
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capacity, pattern recognition, remains to be explained.
Shapiro’s (1997, 115) explanation is not psychologically
satisfying: ‘‘[the] child starts to learn about cardinal
structures by ostensive definition. The parent points to a
group of four objects, says ‘‘four’’, then points to a dif-
ferent group of four objects and repeats the exercise.
Eventually, the child learns to recognize the pattern itself’’.
It remains to be explained how the child can recognize
what it is that stays invariant in the different sets presented
to her (i.e., cardinality). At some point, humans must be
able to discriminate cardinality, and it is not clear how
children can accomplish this. How do we learn to abstract
the four pattern from four notes played on a keyboard, four
trucks passing by or four TV commercials, without already
having some notion of what cardinality is?
2 Innate Mathematical Knowledge in Developmental
Psychology: The Case of Arithmetic
Contemporary scientists working within a nativist research
program consider mathematical knowledge as a paradig-
matic example of innate knowledge (e.g., Spelke and
Kinzler 2007). They rely on a special version of the pov-
erty of the stimulus argument which Samuels (2002) calls
‘the argument from early development’. According to this,
a given concept emerges at a point when it could not have
been learned through experience.
2.1 The Argument from Early Development
1. Under experimental conditions, it is observed that
infants possess a certain capacity, for example, infants
from a few hours after birth can visually discriminate
between collections of two and three objects (Antell
and Keating 1983).
2. This capacity is seen as best explained by positing
some conceptual capacity, in this case, a rudimentary
ability to discriminate small sets.
3. Because the capacity arises so early in development, it
could not have been learned through experience, i.e.,
newborns, having spent time in the dark environment
of the womb, did not have the opportunity to learn to
visually discriminate sets with different numbers of
items.
4. Hence, the structure in question (discrimination of
small numerosities) is probably innate.
To give a focus to our discussion of innate mathematical
knowledge, we will look at one case in detail, namely the
question of whether or not infants possess an innate
capacity to perform arithmetic. In 1992, developmental
psychologist Karen Wynn published an elegant study in
which she argued that our ability to perform the simple
arithmetic operations of subtraction and addition is already
present in 5-month-old infants. Her experiment was based
on the violation of expectation paradigm, a procedure that
is frequently used to probe infants’ knowledge. It relies on
the assumption that infants look longer at events that they
do not expect because these events are more interesting to
them, a property of the human perceptual system that
magicians rely on to capture the attention of their audience.
Infants are first habituated to a given event, which is
repeated over and over until their attention wanes. Then,
during the test itself, subjects are randomly assigned to a
control condition, or to a condition in which the event is
slightly modified so that it violates expectations. With
appropriate controls, evidence that infants look reliably
longer at the unexpected than at the expected event is taken
to indicate that they (1) possess the expectation under
investigation; (2) detect the violation in the unexpected
event, and (3) show an increased interest for this violation.
In Wynn’s experiments, infants witnessed how a puppet
was placed on a stage. A screen was lowered, hiding the
puppet, and they saw how a second doll was placed behind
the screen. If infants can perform the addition 1 ? 1 = 2,
they should expect to see two objects once the screen is
lowered. Indeed, Wynn (1992) found that infants looked
longer when only one puppet was visible (1 ? 1 = 1).
Similarly, infants who saw two puppets on the stage, a
screen placed in front of them, and one of the puppets
being taken away, looked longer at the event 2 - 1 = 2
than at 2 - 1 = 1, which Wynn interpreted as evidence
that they can perform simple subtractions. More recently,
McCrink and Wynn (2004) repeated this experiment with
larger numbers: infants were either presented with possible
arithmetic operations 5 ? 5 = 10 and 10 - 5 = 5, or
impossible results 5 ? 5 = 5, 10 - 5 = 10. Again, the
infants looked longer at the impossible results.
These experiments can be mapped onto the argument
from development as outlined earlier. First, a difference in
looking time between correct and incorrect outcomes is
observed (premise 1). This difference in looking time is
attributed to a capacity of the infants to discriminate
between correct and incorrect arithmetic operations (pre-
mise 2). The time span of 5 months is deemed to be
insufficient to enable infants to learn to perform arithmetic
operations through experience (premise 3). Hence, the
capacity is attributed to the innate ability to discriminate
between correct and incorrect arithmetic operations (con-
clusion). ‘‘[I]nfants possess true numerical concepts—they
have access to the ordering of numerical relationships
between small numbers and can manipulate these concepts
in a numerically meaningful way […] The existence of
these arithmetical abilities so early in infancy suggests that
humans innately possess the capacity to perform simple
The Innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical Concepts 5
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arithmetical calculations, which may provide the founda-
tions of further arithmetical knowledge’’ (Wynn 1992,
750). Thus, like in the early philosophical arguments,
mathematical knowledge is taken to be innate, and to serve
as a basis for the development of further mathematical
skills. The argument from early development relies on a
chain of inductions. The quality of each element in this
chain determines the validity of the argument. Its serial
nature also means that one flaw can potentially undermine
the entire argument. To examine whether the conclusion is
cogent, we will now look at some objections that have been
raised against each step in the chain.
2.2 Premise 1: Infants’ Looking Time Differs Between
Correct and Incorrect Arithmetic Operations
One possible way to call experiments like these into
question is to doubt the experimental procedure on which
they are based. Experiments with infants and animals are
susceptible to the so-called Clever Hans effect, named after
an early twentieth-century horse that could allegedly solve
arithmetic operations by tapping the correct answer with its
hoof. After careful examination, psychologists found that
Hans was sensitive to unconscious cuing of the audience or
its trainer. Ever since then, many precautions are taken to
eliminate Clever Hans effects in animal studies and
developmental psychology. Infants are either seated in a
car seat, or placed on the lap of their parents who wear dark
goggles so as not to see the experimental conditions. The
looking times of infants are coded by two independent
observers who cannot see the experimental procedure, i.e.,
they do not know when it switches from habituation to test,
and they do not know whether the infants are watching the
unexpected or the expected event. Statistical measures of
interobserver agreement are made; only results with a high
interobserver agreement are taken into account. Thus it is
unlikely that the experimenters or parents influence the
judgments of the infants. The experimental setup, and the
observed differences in looking time are therefore usually
accepted, also by opponents of nativism.
2.3 Premise 2: This Success is Best Explained
by the Infants’ Conceptual Knowledge of Number
This step is the most hotly debated by psychologists who
prefer alternative empiricist explanations. For example,
Haith (1998) considers a simpler perception-based alter-
native: in the case where 1 ? 1 = 1, infants are surprised
because one of the objects disappears. If infants still have
lingering perceptual information about the one doll prior to
the screen being raised, next to that of the doll that is being
placed behind it, they should expect 2 dolls. This causes a
mismatch between the subjects’ purely perception-based
expectation and the actual situation (1 doll). Hence, longer
looking-times are caused by extremely long-term sensory
persistence of each object prior to its occlusion—the
infants will look longer at 1 ? 1 = 1 without any arith-
metic skills. A problem with this alternative explanation is
that it invokes a novel mechanism, long-term sensory
persistence. As there is no empirical evidence of its exis-
tence, it would seem that this mechanism is invoked with
the sole purpose of providing a non-cognitive account of
these experiments. Nonetheless, some replications of Wynn
(1992) have attempted to eliminate this alternative account.
Koechlin et al. (1998), for example, replicated the experi-
ment with the puppets on rotating platforms; the constant
revolving of the puppets across the stage excludes the
possibility of extreme sensory persistence. Even under
these conditions, infants looked longer when they wit-
nessed impossible outcomes of subtractions and additions.
Explaining the results in terms of a familiarity prefer-
ence might be a more promising non-cognitive explanation.
According to Cohen and Marks (2002), infants look longer
at 1 ? 1 = 1 because they see only one doll at the
beginning of the experiment, when they are familiarized
with the setup by being seated in front of the theatre and
watching one doll. Similarly, they prefer 2 - 1 = 2
because during these familiarization trials they more fre-
quently see two dolls. To test this alternative explanation,
Cohen and Marks (2002) designed a series of experiments
in which infants were shown 0, 1, 2, and 3 as outcomes of
1 ? 1 and 2 - 1 operations. The results were consistent
with their interpretation of the evidence: the infants looked
much longer at 1 ? 1 = 1 and 2 - 1 = 2 than at the other
incorrect outcomes (1 ? 1 = 0 or 3 and 2 - 1 = 0 or 3).
To control for this bias, Kobayashi et al. (2004) replicated
Wynn’s experiment across modalities (visual and audi-
tory). In their experiments, 5-month-olds were shown a
computer-animated version of Wynn’s experimental setup.
Familiarizations consisted of 1, 2 or 3 dolls falling onto a
platform, producing a distinctive thud with each fall. In the
1 ? 1 = 2 or 1 condition, infants watched a doll falling
from the top of the display onto a platform, making a
distinct thud. After this, a screen appeared in front of the
doll, and the subjects heard a second, similar thud. After
the screen was lowered, they looked longer when only one
doll was present. Similar results were obtained for the
subtraction condition. Since this study controlled for pos-
sible familiarity preferences, it indicates that familiarity
alone cannot explain the experimental results. Berger et al.
(2006) replicated Wynn’s original setup: 6- to 9-month-
olds saw incorrect and correct outcomes while their brain
activity was measured by electrodes placed on the scalp (a
procedure known as Event Related Potentials). In the adult
human brain, there are well-described patterns of brain
activation associated with error detection. The infants’
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brains, like those of adults, showed the same characteristic
pattern of error-detection during the incorrect outcomes.
This provides additional support for the cognitive inter-
pretation of Wynn’s experiments. It appears that there is
currently no rival empiricist explanation that accounts for
the results of these experiments.
2.4 Premise 3: Because the Capacity Arises Early
in Development, it Cannot have been Learned
Through Experience
One can never state with absolute certainty that an early-
developed skill is not the result of experience, except for
skills that are tested immediately after birth, like face
recognition. After all, as Haith (1998) observed, infants of
a few months old have had over 1000 hours of waking
time, corresponding to millions of eye movements, which
could have provided plenty of opportunity to benefit from
visual experience. However, in the case of arithmetic visual
experience alone seems insufficient. Five-month-old
infants cannot voluntarily grasp and release objects: grasp
is present at 4–5 months, but voluntary release only at
9 months due to persistence of the grasp reflex. Empiricist
accounts of the acquisition of arithmetical skills such as
that by Piaget (1952) propose that young children learn the
outcomes of arithmetic operations by placing objects
together, or taking some away, and observing the resulting
number of objects. Infants of 5 months old, who can barely
grasp and not release, cannot experiment in this way by
adding or taking away objects to predict the results of
additions and subtractions. Of course, this does not rule out
other possible empirical ways in which infants could have
learned to predict the outcome of arithmetic operations. It
may well be that whether one takes an empiricist or nativist
perspective to interpret a given body of evidence depends
on the judgment (in the Kuhnian sense) of the experi-
menter, rather than an unambiguous reading of the evi-
dence. Without a detailed empiricist rival explanation,
nativist developmental psychologists may be justified in
claiming that these experiments provide evidence for
innate arithmetic knowledge, without excluding the possi-
bility of a future empiricist rival account.
2.5 Conclusion: The Property in Question is Probably
Innate
What does ‘innate’ mean? Long before innateness was a
scientific concept, it was a philosophical and a folk con-
cept. The historical example of the folk concept of FORCE
that was imported into physics illustrates that such altered
folk concepts can and do play a legitimate role in science
(Mameli and Bateson 2006, 156). The folk concept of
innateness is currently being imported into sciences as
diverse as cognitive science, embryology and palaeoan-
thropology, where it gradually changes to fit the purposes
of these disciplines. Because innateness has been imported
into many diverging disciplines, the explanatory role it
assumes within these differs. As a result, there is no general
definition of ‘innateness’ that covers all disciplines. Evo-
lutionary psychologists, for example, regard an innate trait
as an evolutionary adaptation. They place an emphasis on
universality and developmental invariance, e.g., cross-cul-
tural features of human mate selection are seen as evidence
for evolved preferences for desirable traits in mates. By
contrast, developmental psychologists do not use explicit
evolutionary frameworks to reason about knowledge in
infants. Rather, they consider cognitive traits to be innate if
there is no correct developmental psychological account to
explain how the infants could have learned them. This is
precisely the motivation behind the argument from early
development. Because the explanation of innateness
depends on the discipline in which it is used, Samuels
(2002) regards an innate idea as one for which there is no
correct scientific account within that discipline. In the case
of innate arithmetic, if developmental psychologists cannot
explain this ability as a result of learning, it becomes
‘innate’ by default within that discipline. This is not to say that
there is no correct scientific account for this ability in another
discipline, such as genetics or cognitive neuroscience.
3 From Intuitive to Formal Mathematical Knowledge
If nativist claims for mathematical principles turn out to be
sound, how can we assert that these skills are important for
the development of mathematical knowledge? Although
both claims (i.e., mathematical skills are innate, and these
innate skills form the basis of mathematical knowledge) are
logically independent, they are often conflated. Until
recently, developmental psychologists assumed almost
without question that the rudimentary numerical capacities
exhibited by infants and nonhuman animals lie at the basis
of more complex mathematical knowledge. Nevertheless,
the question of how these capacities give rise to mathe-
matical theory remains unresolved.
A wealth of empirical evidence suggests that the
capacities to represent numerosities, to perform elementary
arithmetic operations, and to detect ordinal relationships
between different collections of items are present in infants
and nonhuman animals (see Feigenson et al. 2004, for an
overview). It seems reasonable to suppose that such
capacities form the precursors of formalized ways of rea-
soning about number and arithmetic. But it remains diffi-
cult to pinpoint the causal arrow between intuitive and
formal mathematical concepts. It is quite possible that both
The Innateness Hypothesis and Mathematical Concepts 7
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domains are independent, i.e., that there is no overlap
between intuitive and formal mathematical concepts, and
that the similarities are only superficial. In order to rec-
oncile intuitive and formal numerical competence, three
possible ways are open to us. One strategy consists in
attempting to characterize preverbal numerical represen-
tations in terms of number theory. If intuitive number
concepts are in some way isomorphic to theoretical number
concepts, then it is conceivable that children can go from
their initial numerical skills to an understanding of natural
numbers, negative numbers, fractions and so on. A second
strategy examines the process of natural number acquisi-
tion in young children, and attempts to spot parallels
between this process and properties of number theory—if
such parallels exist, it is relatively unproblematic to explain
the emergence of formal number concepts in children. A
third strategy is more indirect, and attempts to show that
intuitive number concepts are important for the acquisition
of more formalized arithmetic skills. This approach can be
situated within philosophical positions that emphasize
mathematical practice, rather than the theoretical founda-
tions of mathematics. We will critically discuss each
position in turn.
3.1 Characterizing Intuitive Numbers Formally
How can intuitive numerical representations be character-
ized? Several mathematicians (e.g., Kronecker and Brou-
wer) accorded a privileged position to the natural numbers
in their attempt to find a foundation for arithmetic: they
thought that natural numbers were given through intuition,
and that from these we can construct all other numbers.
However, there is a mismatch between the natural numbers
and the representations of cardinality by nonhuman ani-
mals and human infants. The latter are imprecise; this
imprecision increases rapidly with the magnitude of the
numerosities. For example, while newborns can reliably
discriminate between collections of two and three items,
they fail to see the difference between four and six,
although the ratio difference is identical (Antell & Keating
1983). Likewise, in a classical study (Meck and Church
1983) in which rats were trained to press a lever n times
(with n ranging between 4 and 24), the animals became less
and less accurate as the required number of lever-presses
increased. The same increasing imprecision is also
observed in adults who are required to make a number of
key presses or to estimate the number of light flashes at a
rate that makes counting impossible (Whalen et al. 1999).
To date, no nonhuman animal has mastered the open-
ended structure of natural numbers in a way that 4-year-old
human children in many cultures have. Typically, chim-
panzees and other animals can be taught to remember
numerosities by learning each magnitude separately. In one
study, a female chimpanzee learned to associate arabic
digits with cardinal values by brute association. In the
initial training of the number 2, she apparently assumed
that ‘2’ meant ‘more than one’, eventually learning to
apply the arabic numerals ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ correctly. Instead
of generalizing this procedure to numbers[3, she evidently
went on to assume that ‘3’ meant more than two, which
brought her competence at assigning ‘4’ correctly to
chance level until she eventually also learned 4, and this up
to 9 (Biro and Matsuzawa 2001). The insight that this
property can be generalized, i.e., that for every natural
number n there is a number n ? 1, appears to be restricted
to humans.
Interestingly, several human cultures seem to lack nat-
ural number representations. For example, the Piraha˜, a
Brazilian indigenous culture, do not possess words that
denote natural numbers (Gordon 2004). The Piraha˜ lan-
guage has only three standardized words to denote cardi-
nality, often translated as ‘one’ (ho´i), ‘two’ (hoı´) and
‘many’ (baa´giso). In one study (Frank et al. 2008), Piraha˜
subjects were presented with arrays of objects in increasing
order (from 1 to 10) and asked to denote how many items
they saw. Subsequently, the items were presented in
decreasing order (from 10 to 1). The use of the terms ‘ho´i’,
‘hoı´’ and ‘baa´giso’ was not consistent, but depended on the
order in which the items were presented: when objects
were presented in increasing order, most subjects said that
six items were ‘baa´giso’ (many), whereas in decreasing
order, most subjects said ‘hoı´’ (two) when presented with
the same six objects. Hence, the authors concluded that the
Piraha˜ language has no words that correspond to our con-
cept of natural numbers, not even in an approximate sense.
Given that natural numbers are not present in infants and
nonhuman animals, and not even in all human cultures,
they are unlikely candidates to describe our innate
numerical skills.
Gallistel and Gelman (2000) proposed that magnitudes
on the mental number line could be conceptualized as real
numbers. Real numbers differ from natural numbers in
several interesting respects: the latter are countable and
discrete, whereas the former (e.g., H2 or p) are uncount-
able and dense; they cannot be put into a one-to-one cor-
respondence with a list of items. Gallistel and Gelman
chose reals, because they are non-discrete like the repre-
sentations of number in infants and nonhuman animals. As
shown in Fig. 1a, these can be illustrated by tuning curves,
which are normally distributed around given quantities. In
the rhesus monkey brain, individual neurons that respond
to numerosity show this approximation: neurons optimally
responding to four items also exhibit some activation for
values between 2 and 6 (Tudusciuc and Nieder 2007).
However, there is no evidence that nonhuman animals
would be capable of representing real numbers such as e or
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123
1.01001000100001. Moreover, as natural numbers form a
subset of the real numbers, this account fails to explain
why animals are not able to master natural numbers. It
remains unclear how humans go from this kind of
numerical concept to counting: in contrast to natural
numbers, there is no definite next tag within real numbers,
e.g., for 1, any number greater than 1 such as
1.00000000001 could be a next tag (Laurence and Margolis
2005).
Whereas the set of natural numbers can be mapped onto
a linear scale, it remains unclear whether or not animals
and infants represent numerosities in this way. Their rep-
resentations appear to be compressed for larger magnitudes
such that the perceived distance between 2 and 3 is larger
than the perceived distance between 22 and 23. This effect
of decreasing discriminability with increasing size is very
robust, and has been documented in nonhuman animals
(Meck and Church 1983), preschoolers (Siegler and Booth
2004), and in people from cultures with inexact number
words (Dehaene et al. 2008). Hence, some authors have
proposed that such estimations of numerosities conform to
the natural logarithms (Ln) of these numbers (Fig. 1a). As
can be seen, the variability is fixed, i.e., around each value
the variability of responses follows the same normal dis-
tribution. As the logarithmic curves overlap increasingly
with their neighbors, higher numerosities are more difficult
to tell apart—this explains why it is easier to tell three
items from four than it is to discriminate 23 from 24.
However, several psychologists (e.g., Le Corre and
Carey 2007) disagree with this interpretation, and contend
that intuitive number representations, both in young chil-
dren and nonhuman animals, can be more accurately cap-
tured using a linear representation with scalar variability
(Fig. 1b). Scalar variability means that the standard devi-
ation of the estimate of some quantity is a linear function of
its absolute value, i.e., the larger the value, the higher the
standard deviation, and the broader the tuning curves.
Therefore, representations of small collections up to three
or four are reasonably accurate, whereas those of larger
numbers become increasingly imprecise and noisy. It
remains difficult to decide between logarithmic and scalar
variable representations because they yield similar
predictions in most (but not all) circumstances. For
example, they both predict the distance effect, namely the
fact that smaller numerosities are discriminated faster and
more accurately. In sum, the evidence taken together sug-
gests that intuitive number representations do not corre-
spond to any well-established set in number theory (such as
natural numbers or reals), and there is currently no con-
sensus as to how they can be best represented (logarithmic
or linear). Given the current state of affairs, attempts to
characterize preverbal number concepts in terms of number
theory reveal little about the relationship between intuitive
and formal mathematical ideas.
3.2 Learning Natural Numbers Through Axiomatic
Systems
Some philosophers of mathematics focus on how children
learn the natural numbers. If this learning process captures
some significant properties of axiomatizations of arithme-
tic, such an approach might highlight important psycho-
logical continuities between intuitive and formal concepts.
According to one account, children learn the natural
numbers by adopting the successor function, which is
central to the Dedekind-Peano axiomatizations of arith-
metic. The successor function is a primitive function,
which states that if a given n is a natural number, so is its
successor, i.e., S(1) = 2, S(2) = 3, and so on. Many psy-
chologists (e.g., Le Corre and Carey 2007) regard the
successor function as a crucial building block in the
understanding of numerosities. According to one popular
account (e.g., Carey 2004), children learn to map the
meanings of the words for ‘one’, ‘two’ and ‘three’ onto
their pre-existing intuitive representations of these quanti-
ties. This seems sensible, as nonhuman animals can also
easily discriminate between these small collections (e.g.,
Uller et al. 2003). Children then recognize the successor
function within the first words of their counting list, and,
through induction generalize this principle to higher num-
ber words (four, five, and so on): if a numeral n refers to
cardinal value n and p immediately follows n in the count
list then p refers to n ? 1. A problem with this account is
that the Dedekind-Peano axioms do not characterize our
Fig. 1 Two competing
hypotheses on how intuitive
numerosities are represented
a logarithmic with fixed
variability, and b linear with
scalar variability
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everyday use of number words. Some authors (e.g., Rips
et al. 2008) are skeptic about the assumption that children
can make the inductive step from small numerosities to a
list of counting words. For one thing, why would children
conclude that ‘two’ refers to collections of exactly two
objects, rather than approximately two objects, as the Pi-
raha˜ do? As we have seen, nonhuman animals, even our
closest relative the chimpanzee, seem to be unable to do so,
even after extensive training (Biro and Matsuzawa 2001).
Decock (2008) provides an alternative account in which
equinumerosity (also known as Hume’s principle) rather
than the successor function is conceptualized as the basis
for learning natural numbers. According to this notion, if
humans have the concept of COLLECTION, they can discover
that two collections have the same number of items by
putting their members into a one-to-one correspondence,
either physically or by means of a stably ordered verbal list
of counting words or body parts. Indeed, in many cultures,
one-to-one correspondence is used to denote quantities in
this way. The Loboda, for example, are a Papua New
Guinean aboriginal culture where gift exchange plays an
important role in the local economy. To judge whether a
gift is fairly distributed or reciprocated, objects of a spe-
cific category (e.g., yams, bunches of tobacco) are piled up
or placed in baskets, and these collections are compared to
each other. Once the collections are of equivalent size, the
Loboda know that the distribution is fair, even though they
do not know the exact cardinality (Thune 1978). Also,
some experiments (e.g., Jordan and Brannon 2006) suggest
that infants can spontaneously detect equinumerosity: they
can match the number of talking heads they see on a screen
to the number of voices they hear. Still, Hume’s principle,
as Rips et al. (2008) note, is not sufficient to specify the
natural numbers. It is consistent, for example, with systems
containing only a finite set of numbers, and with systems
that contain cardinals beyond the natural numbers (e.g.,
fractions). To get positive integers only, one needs to
invoke some additional definitions that require successor
series.
Both approaches share a similar problem. Even if the
successor function or equinumerosity can provide a basis of
arithmetic from a formal point of view, this does not
guarantee that either actually lies at the basis of numerical
abilities. These axiomatizations were never meant to con-
ceptualize everyday numerical skills, but rather to provide
a consistent foundation from which arithmetic could be
derived. As Dedekind (cited in Greiffenhagen and Sharrock
2006) remarked: ‘‘…many a reader will scarcely recognize
in the shadowy forms which I bring before him his num-
bers which all his life long have accompanied him as
faithful and familiar friends.’’ Conflating number theory
with everyday practices of counting may be a category
mistake.
3.3 The Importance of Innate Numerical Skills
for Mathematical Practice
Everyday mathematical practice suggests a distinction
between the foundational work of axiomatizing mathe-
matical theory and the daily work of mathematicians.
Dedekind noted that axiomatizations of arithmetic are not
meant to capture our everyday use of number; it is also
interesting to observe that mathematicians rely to an
important extent on informal, intuitive modes of reasoning,
especially in the early stages of creativity. In their
description of the mathematical experience, Davis and
Hersh (1981, 399) stress the importance of intuitive,
everyday mathematical practice, and go as far as to say,
‘‘[T]he study of mental objects with reproducible proper-
ties is called mathematics. Intuition is the faculty by which
we can consider or examine these (internal, mental)
objects’’. In this way, everyday numerical practice, such as
arithmetic or comparing numerosities, is continuous with
formal mathematics. Indeed, the emphasis on formal
aspects of mathematics, such as proofs, is a recent phe-
nomenon of western culture that seems absent in other
cultures with a rich mathematical tradition, like the medi-
eval Islamic world or imperial China. Even in western
mathematics up to the eighteenth century mathematicians
were primarily concerned with getting results, and their
successes were many. It is doubtful whether these suc-
cesses would have been achieved had Euler and his con-
temporaries been burdened by the standards of rigor of
today. In the early nineteenth century, this situation chan-
ged dramatically: mathematicians such as Cauchy and
Bolzano demanded rigorous proofs of the theorems about
concepts that had hitherto been understood mainly intui-
tively. For example, as early as 1629, Girard wrote that any
nth degree equation has n real roots—a first step towards
what later became known as the Fundamental Theorem of
Algebra. However, it was not until 1806 that Argand
published a rigorous proof of it, for the first time specifying
that the theorem holds when the coefficients are complex,
rather than real (Grabiner 1986). Still, the role of nonfor-
mal mathematical practice has not disappeared in current
mathematics. The initial belief that a proof may be correct,
such as Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s last theorem, usually does
not depend on thorough scrutiny, but on concurrence with
high-level ideas (some might say, gut feeling) long before
the details are checked (Thurston 2006).
Another reason to think that informal mathematical
practice is important for the development of mathematics
as a formal discipline is historical. Whenever accurate
historical accounts of mathematical practice are available,
we can observe that mathematical techniques develop in
response to practical needs. The elaborate mathematical
tools developed in Han dynasty China (202 BC-220 AD),
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which involved solutions to simultaneous linear equations
with several unknowns, was concerned with the needs of
the early developing empire, and provided solutions for
calculating taxes, dividing inheritance, and organizing
large-scale public works. Medieval Islamic geometry was
applied to prestige architecture (e.g., the construction of a
round cupola on the square basis of mausoleums), seafaring
and the calculation of the q’ibla, the relative position of
Mecca. If it can be shown that innate mathematical abilities
are indeed essential for the development of mathematical
practice, then we have reason to believe that these are in
some way foundational for mathematics as a formal sci-
ence, as the early nativist philosophers like Plato, Des-
cartes, Leibniz and Kant originally proposed.
To illustrate this line of reasoning, we again draw from
the domain of arithmetic. As we have argued in Sect. 2,
infants are able to predict the outcomes of very simple
arithmetic operations, but this does not imply that this
ability underpins the later development of more complex
arithmetic skills. Yet several lines of evidence suggest that
innate arithmetic skills are constitutive of later arithmetic
competence. Gilmore et al. (2007) asked 5-year-olds to
solve symbolic arithmetic tasks in verbal format or with
arabic digits. The problems involved large numbers, such
that the preschoolers could not have learned the outcomes
yet, for example ‘‘Sarah has fifteen candies and gets
nineteen more, John has 51 candies. Who has more can-
dies?’’ Children had about 73% of the answers correct,
significantly above chance, which rules out guessing as a
strategy. The authors then examined possible reasons for
the children’s successes. First, they looked at the possi-
bility that they might have learned some symbolic arith-
metic facts by heart (e.g., 5 ? 9 = 14) and drew on these
as a basis for other problems. However, the subjects failed
to provide correct solutions to exact problems of this form.
Next, they examined whether or not children drew on
approximate arithmetic. They found that the accuracy
depended on the ratio between the numbers, a clear sig-
nature of approximate numerical competence, which has
also been found in monkeys—when rhesus monkeys per-
form arithmetic tasks, they also become increasingly
imprecise as the ratio difference drops (Flombaum et al.
2005). In agreement with the view that approximate
arithmetic skills underlie exact arithmetic performance,
Halberda et al. (2008) showed that teenagers who do well
on approximate arithmetic tasks are more likely to perform
well on mathematics at school.
Studies that measure differences in brain activation
(e.g., Venkatraman et al. 2005) indicate that nonsymbolic
arithmetic activates brain regions that are very similar to
those involved in symbolic arithmetic. Regardless of
whether subjects solve additions by looking at collections
of dots that are added together or by adding up arabic
digits, the intraparietal sulci, areas of the brain involved in
a wide variety of numerical tasks, show increased activa-
tion. Previous studies that measured the individual activa-
tion in neurons of rhesus monkeys (Tudusciuc and Nieder
2007) indicate that the intraparietal sulci contain number-
sensitive neurons, which are sensitive to the cardinality of a
collection of items, but not sensitive to other properties,
such as size or shape. Although these studies do not
demonstrate a direct, causal link between innate and formal
mathematical knowledge, they suggest that innate abilities
are essential for the development of mathematical skills.
If approximate numerical competences are important for
the development of formal mathematics, one would expect
that people from cultures without formal arithmetic can
spontaneously figure out arithmetic principles. The Yupno,
a Papua New Guinean aboriginal people, do not perform
arithmetic operations, possibly because it has little prac-
tical value for them. At the market, for example, objects are
placed in piles of a value of 10 toea; if one is interested in
the product, one simply picks up a heap and leaves a coin
of 10 toea, which obviates the need for calculations.
Wassmann and Dasen (1994) probed Yupno knowledge of
arithmetic, amongst others by asking subtractions in the
form of bride price problems, e.g., 17 - 9 became ‘‘you
need 17 pigs to pay a bride price, and you have already
given 9 pigs to your prospective father-in-law. How many
pigs do you still need?’’ Subjects could calculate the sub-
tractions by recasting them into additions, in this case, by
adding up from 9 and determining how much is needed to
reach 17—in other words, they spontaneously figured out a
relationship between addition and subtraction. In another
experiment, monolingual children who spoke either Warl-
piri or Anindilyakwa, two Australian aboriginal languages
lacking exact number words, were asked to divide 6 or 9
discs among three toy bears. Despite their unfamiliarity
with division, most children successfully solved the prob-
lem by using a one-to-one correspondence strategy, giving
each toy a disc until all were divided (Butterworth et al.
2008). Several Oksapmin adolescents from a Papua New
Guinean culture with a 29-part body-part counting system
spontaneously developed an ingenious method for solving
additions and subtractions by slightly modifying their
body-part counting system. To calculate 7 ? 5, they star-
ted counting at the body part that denotes 7, i.e., ‘right
lower arm’. While counting, they used the words from 1 to
5, i.e., the words from ‘right thumb’ to ‘right pink’. Once
this count was completed, they could check where they
ended up, which in this case was ‘right ear’, denoting 12
(Saxe 1985). These examples, while far from a systematic
cross-cultural comparative study, suggest that intuitions
about basic arithmetic operations are shared across cultures.
Of course, there are many cross-cultural differences in the
way arithmetic operations are solved, in the base-sizes that
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are used, and in the way numerals are denoted. Yet to date,
no culture has been found where arithmetic deviates widely,
e.g., where 2 ? 2 is consistently taken to equal 5. Across
cultures, simple arithmetic operations like addition and
subtraction have the same underlying structure, even
though the manner in which results are obtained can vary
widely.
4 Concluding Remarks
In the history of philosophy, mathematics has often served
as a paradigmatic example of innate ideas. Although
nativism does not figure in current philosophy of mathe-
matics, it is an important guiding principle in developmental
psychological investigations of mathematical knowledge. In
this paper, we provided a detailed analysis of the claim by
Wynn (1992) and other developmental psychologists that
knowledge of some principles of arithmetic operations is
innate, by spelling out the argumentative structure in detail
and by examining some responses to objections against this
claim. Our examination of possible relationships between
intuitive and formal arithmetic indicates that there are good
reasons to think that innate numerical abilities play a sig-
nificant role in the development of arithmetic competence,
even though intuitive number concepts do not correspond to
any established set in number theory, and even though
children’s learning of number does not clearly follow axi-
omatizations of number. This proposal does not solve the
problem of how exactly children go from intuitive numerical
skills to arithmetic. A satisfying account of this likely
involves both internal and external cognitive factors, such as
the use of symbolic representation systems or finger
counting as epistemic tools (De Cruz 2008). Our discussion
of arithmetic corroborates the view, defended by early
nativist philosophers, that mathematical skills have a cog-
nitive basis, and that this provides a foundation for more
formalized mathematical knowledge.
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